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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif{-Respondent,
vs.
BERNADETTE VASTADORE
SHIELDS,
Defendant-A ppeUant.

l
Case No.
12880

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Bernadette Vastadore Shields, appeals from a conviction on jury trial of the crime of
Grand Larceny.

DISPOSITION IN TUE LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted on jury trial of the
crime of Grand Larceny in the County of Millard, State
of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding, and
pursuant to said conviction the Court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a
term of not less than one nor more than ten years.

2

RELi EF

SOl'(~HT

ON APPEAL

The a ppclla11t seeks a reversal of the conviction
helm,· and a 11cw trial.
STATEl\IEXT OF FACTS

The State presented evidence that money Imel been
taken from a clepartlllent store in Filllllore, Utah ancl
niclenec was presented which placed appellant and a
frlllale ehild in the store during the approximate time
the money wa~ taken and near the place the money was
l<wated, although no persons saw appellant take anything.
S11hseq11e11t to the appellant leaving the store, it
was clisem·ered that money had been taken, ancl a call
was place!! to law en foreement agencies in the southern
part of Utah tn he 011 the lookout for two elderly female
persons one heing attire!l in a red dress and shoes and
being !lark con1pleetcd. (TR 142-143).
,\11 officer in Par<Jwan obse1Ted what he considered
to he two fc>male persons possibly matching the description he hnd reeei,·ecl. The two female persons, along
'rith the male driver of the car were slopped, in front
of the Parowan Cafe, after the females had gone into
a se1Tiee station anrl returned to the ear.
The female occupants were placed under arrest
an!l

the~·

followed the officer in their car to the Paro-
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wan Jail. (TH 1:n). The females were placed in jail.
The man was allowed to leave in his car .
•\ ftcr checking with the II ighway Patrol, the offi('Cr, who was the Chief of Police of Parowan, went to
the Parowan Cafe where the male had gone ancl brought
hi111 hack to the jail. (TH 138). The automobile was
left 11nattemle<l ancl locked at the Parowan Cafe. (TR

1:rn, I 4G).
A period of time later, the car was driven by aii
officer who had come from Ceclar City to the Parowan
Police Garage where it was locked up. (Transcript of
Motion to Suppres~ 28). The car remained in the possession and under the control of law enforcement officers. (TH 14G). Later, a warrantless search was made
of the vehicle. (Tl\IP 15, IG, 20).
l\Ioney was discovered in the glove compartment
of the vehicle. (TH 148).
Prior to the trial appellant filed a motion for the
suppression of' the evidence obtained from the search o,f
the vehicle. Appellant's motion was denied (TMP 62},
and the money found in the vehicle was introduced as
evidence at trial. (TR 140).

ARGUMENT
l\IOXEY OBTAINED FROl\I THE AUT01\lOlHLE

IX

WHICH

APPELLANT

WAS

HIDl:\C \\'.\S TIIE FIUTIT OF AX U.NLAWFl 'L SE1\IU'II F :\I) ER TIIE. FOURTH
.\:\IE:\Inrn:\T TO THE UNITED STATES
CO:\STITPTJOX ,\.ND WAS INADl\IISSABLE AT THIAL.
X o warran1 was e\·er ohtainecl for a search of the
aulolllohile in which appellant was ricling. The burden,
therefore, falls upon the prosecution to establish that
the search was rnacle pursuant to one of the narrowly
dra\l'n exceptions to the constitutional mandate that 110
~carch may he effected until a warrant for the search
is obtained. Searches 111:ule outside the judicial process,
i.c. searchi,s Jllade without first ha1·ing ohtainecl juclil'ial approntl fur the search in the form of a warrant
issued hy a judge or magistrate, arc eonsiderccl per sc
1111reasonahle. I~at::: l'. l'11itcd ,\'talcs. 38!) lT.S. 3-J.7, rn
L Ed 2d .37(), 88 S Ct. 507. Those claiming that a warrantless M~arch was made pursuant to one of the few
exceptions to the general proscription must show exigent
C'ircnmstances ncees~itating the course tif action taken.

P11itcd States
S Ct. n:~.

1· .

.Tc/fcrs, 342 U.S. 48, !Hi L Eel 5fl, 72

,\ long reL·ognizcd exception to the warrant requirement \'ali1lates warrantless searches if they are made
"inl'iden t to a law fol arrest." See United Stat cs t•.

Ra/JinmL"il-::, 3:lH U.S. 5ti, !)4 L E<l 6J3, 70 S Ct. 430.
For a search to he incident to a lawful arrest, it must
he condudecl not only within a certain geographical area
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\\·ithi11 whieh an arrestee may obtain weapons or destroy
eridenec, see Chimcl '1'. Cali/ornia, 3!),j U.S. 752, 23 L
Ed 2d (i85, 8H S Ct. 2034, but it must also be conducted
at a time that is "substantially contemporaneous with
the arrest." Vale '1'. Loui.~ianfl, 3!)!) U.S. 30, 26 L Ed 2d
40\l, BO S Ct. 1 !Hi!l.
I 11 the instant case, all persons associated with the
autrnnoliile in question were incarcerated in the Parowan
.Jail. Transcript pp. 1:n, 138. The automobile remained
totally 1111atte11dc<l for a period of time. The custody and
control of the automobile was then assumed by law enf'orec111ent offiecrs. The automobile was removed to the
Parowan Police garage. and the search was made a
period of time later.
The search clearly cannot he considered as having
been made inci<lcnt to a lawful arrest for the search is
remote with respect to both time and geographical proxi111ity. As has been stated by the United States Supreme
Court, " [ o] nee an accused is under arrest and in
e11stody, then a search made at another place, without a
warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." Prcstori.
l'. C'11itcd States, a7n U.S. 3G4, 3G7, II L Ed 2d 777,
780. 84 S Ct. 881; Cham/Jcrs '1'. MaronelJ, a!Hl U.S. 42,
21i L Ed 2<l 4rn, 90 S Ct. l!J75.
A second exception to the requirement that no
search may he made without first having obtained a
warr:mt is that which permits warrantless searches whenever there is probable cause to do so, said exception hav-

i11g lw('ll spamwd i11 C"rrol l'. l'11i/{'(l Stall's. 2G7 U.S.
I:l:!. ti!I L Eel ,')4:!, ~..i S Ct. :!80. This principle was rea f'f'iri11ed i11 Cl1111nbcrs '" ,1/aro11cy, :rnn U.S. 42, 2fl
L Ed :!d +rn, !10 S Ct. 1!17,). where the comt upheld a
\1·a1Ta11tk"i~ scarl'h made at the police station subsequent
to a11 arrest. I I owcnT, i11 Clirunbcrs, Sil pra, the court
c111phasizcll that while probable cause may JH'ovide legal
justification for a warrantlcss search, it does not always
do so, the eritieal consideration being the circumstances
under which the search was made and the resulting
necessity for dispensing with a warrant.
".N' either Carroll,

Sil pra,

nor other cases in this

Cnu1t require or suggest that in every conceivable

circu111~tam·c

t~·it h

prol}(//Jlc

the search of an auto cz•cn

c1111sc

may he made without the

extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords."

mm

P.S. at 50. 2G L Ed 2d at 428, 90

S Ct. l!J7;j. [Emphasis added].
The court in Chambers, supra, noted that the c1rcumstanees which might hottom a warrantless search based
011 prnhahle eause woulll he those where the car is movable. the oecupa11ts are a ltcred, the auto may be removed
from the juris£lictio11 and there is a chance that the contents of the auto may never he seen again.
None of the facts which might justify a warrantless search base<l on probable cause were in existence
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in the instant ease. Assuming" that probable cause did
e:-.:ist (although there is some cloubt in that a description of the automobile was nc\·er given, nor did the arresting officer have any reason to believe that the male
oll'ner a11cl driver was implicated since the officer was
!Doking for two female persons), there was no emergeney nor exigent circumstances necessitating a warrantkss search, for the automobile and the keys necessary
for its operation were in the custody and under the control of law enforcement officers who could have obtained a warrant at their leisure.

•

In Coolidge l'. 1Vcw llmnpshirc, 403 U.S. 443, 29
L Ed 2d 5oJ., 91 S Ct. 2022, the Unitecl States Supreme
Court discnssccl its holclin.g in the Chambers case and
Carroll, supra. upon which Chambers was based. Recognizing the conflict between the rights of the individual
to remain secure from unreasonable searches and the
nec1l for la11· enforcement agencies to adequately pursue
the gathering· of evidence in connection with criminal
prosceutions, the Court struck a balanced position which
docs not unduly impinge upon either interest. Recognizing the legitimate applieation of different standards
when a seareh of automobiles or other mobile instrumentalities is concerned, the Court nevertheless emphasized
that "[t]he won! 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears." 40;) U.S. at 461, 29 L Ed 2d at 580, 91 S Ct.
2022. The Court repudiated the concept of an automatic
exeeption merely because the search of an automobile
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is invoked and cYen though probable cause may exist.
Hather, the Court again emmicate<l the principle
that a search must he made pursuant to a warrant unless
"it is not praeticahle to secure a warrant." Id., 40:3 U.S.
at 4G~. ~H L Ed ~d at 580, Ul S Ct. 2022.
If it is eYer practicable to secure a warrant pnor
to a searC'h, the case with which we are now concerned
presented such practicability. The officers themseh'es
1ie,·cr trcate(l the factual circumstances surrounding
their invoh·emcnt with the car as exigent. This is evidence(] by their almost casual interest in the car which,
first. al1011c(l the car to he moved by the husband without supcn·isio11 a11(l without anyone being able to detcm1ine what, if anything, might be done with the cars
contents. and. seco11d, whiC'h allowed the car to remain
u11alternled for a perirnl of lime after the husband had
been brought back to the jail.
The automobile came under the exclusive control
of' law enforcement officers who e\'entually effected a
~eareh. The search was made some time after the officers
hall rcllucc<l the auto to their possession. From the offiecrs own aetions. the absence of exigent circumstances
is dear.
Consideri11g the passage of time within which a
warrant couhl have been obtained, and noting that the
neell for the warrant arose during a normal working day
in a populated area where a magistrate would be readily

at Iia11cl, it requires a massive stretch of the imagination
to co11cl11dc that it was not practicable to obtain a warrant. At the most, it was a simple task and one which in
1w conccivalilc way could have impeded the officers in
the performance of their duties.
CONCLUSION
,\ warrant for a serch must be obtained where it is
practicable to do so, and the principle applies to cases
inrnlving the searches of a11tolllobiles unless exigent circumstances make it not practicable to obtain a warrant.
" o emcrgenc~· or exigent
.
.
t ances ex1ste
. d at t 1'
",
c1rcums
1i ·
time of the search made in connection with the case at
hand. Since no warrant was obtained, the search was unreasonable and in violation of the }'ourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and objects taken
pursuant to the search were inacbnissable as evidence at
the trial of defendant.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. STANSFIELD
Attorney for Appellant

